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A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific
Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence
TERRI PERE1rI*
Social Science research refutes much of the conventional wisdom regardingjudicial
independence. Evidence abounds that American judges possess only a modest
amount of independence and that their independence is politically-conditioned and
used for ideological purposes rather than rights protection. I argue here that we
must embrace these social scientific facts normatively and that, contrary to the
traditional view, doing so poses no great difficulty. In fact, the political uses of and
political conditions attending judicial independence are normatively desirable.
They promote political accountability, contribute to stable and more pluralistic
democratic governance, and fit perfectly in the system of mutual institutional
interdependencies that the Framers wisely created.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "judicial independence" refers to a set of normative and empirical
claims about judges in their relationships with others. In making their decisions
independent judges are free from pressure applied by outside actors. When they enjoy
such safeguards as life tenure and protection against salary diminution, judges need
not fear retribution from the public or powerful politicians. As a result, they can
decide in accordance with the law, not dominant opinion or the desires of other
branches. Several normative ends are thereby served. Even when unpopular, the
rights and liberties expressed in legal texts can be effectively protected. Rule-of-law
values are also promoted as all individuals and groups, weak or strong, are subject to
the same legal rules.
Empirical, conceptual, and normative challenges to this model are abundant, ' and
this article fits squarely in that tradition. It synthesizes, from the sizable empirical
literature on courts, several social science findings of direct relevance for judicial
independence:
* Judicial independence does not guarantee such social goods as prosperity,
stability, and human rights.
• Judges use what freedom they have to decide in accordance with their
ideological preferences.
* Judges possess only a modest amount of independence.
* Judicial independence is a product of political conditions and incentives, not
formal structural protections.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara University.
See, e.g., JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002)[hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE].
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These are facts that any normative theory of judicial independence must
acknowledge. Doing so, however, is not as difficult as might be expected. In fact, I
view these research findings with relief rather than alarm and provide normative
approval to each. Simply put, I argue that it is good that judicial independence is
limited and politically conditioned, and it is good that judicial independence is used
for ideological purposes and not rights protection.
As Burbank and Friedman note, too many scholars treat judicial independence as
a "monolith," failing to provide contextual information by identifying on which courts
they focus, or they concentrate exclusively on the federal courts, particularly the U.S.
Supreme Court.2 I commit the latter sin though not the former, relating political
science research on the Supreme Court to several normative issues regarding judicial
independence. I focus on the Supreme Court since that is my area of expertise, and
significant normative disagreements remain that need to be addressed. I do concede,
however, that judicial independence means something far different for "a trial court,
deciding questions of fact and applying law in a hierarchical system of precedent" as
compared to the Supreme Court, deciding momentous questions of public policy and
creating binding precedent for other courts to follow.3 I also agree that state courts,
the workhorses of the American judiciary, deserve more scholarly attention. With that
qualification made, I now turn to the central task of exploring the normative
implications of social science research regarding courts for the issue of judicial
independence.
I. THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Extravagant claims are made on behalf ofjudicial independence. It is regarded as
a guarantor of a variety of noble ends-the rule of law, democratic stability, economic
development, and human rights.4 Given their frequency, it is surprising that these
claims have received such little empirical investigation and support.
Charles Cameron's review confirms that research into these presumed causal
connections is quite skimpy.5 For example, he found no studies of the relationship
2 Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 9, I1.
3 Id. at 19.
4 See, e.g., MAURO CAPPELLET T, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971);
Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection Around the World, 85
JUDICATURE 195, 195-96 (2002).Bruce Fein & Burt Neubome, Why Should We Care About
Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 63 (2000); Penny J. White, It's a
Wonderful Life, or is It? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 1, 8
(1996).
5 See Charles M. Cameron, Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It?
And, Who Cares?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 134, 144-45.
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between judicial independence and democratic stability.6 With regard to judicial
independence and economic development, Cameron reports that the Barro study
found a "significant, and substantively important link between economic growth and
'rule of law values.' "7 Yamanishi, however, found no connection between judicial
independence and rule-of-law values.8 Additionally, the Yamanishi study failed to
verify that judicial independence has a positive impact on economic growth.9 Finally,
Keith reports that, although judicial independence provisions individually have only a
small impact on human rights behavior by the state, the "combined impact" of several
such provisions "is rather substantial."' 0
Lewis Komhauser argues that "[j]udicial independence is not a necessary
condition for either stability or [economic] development,""I pointing out that,
although its judiciary lacks independence, Japan has had both a highly stable
government and an impressive record of economic growth.12 He additionally notes
that nations in the OECD have achieved stability and prosperity, despite employing a
wide variety of adjudicative structures. 13
Walter Murphy approaches the issue more indirectly by exploring the
effectiveness of several different systems of governance in achieving peace,
prosperity, freedom from oppression, and stability.' 4 While acknowledging a variety
of empirical limitations, he concludes that constitutional democracy (of which judicial
independence is a significant part) yields important benefits, but also entails risks. 15
For example, it effectively protects citizens from government, though not from each
other; offers a "realistic" promise of peace; facilitates political stability (though
unevenly); impoverishes the civic culture; and produces a "good record" with regard
to economic growth (though it is outperformed by "coercive capitalism"). 16 Like
6 Id. at 144.
7 Id. at 143 (citing Robert Barro, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in GOVERNING FOR
PROSPERrrY 209 (2000)).
8 Id.; see David S. Yamanishi, Rule of Law, Property Rights, and Human Rights: An
Empirical Study of the Effects (and Non-effects) of Legal Institutions (2000) (unpublished paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,
D.C.) (on file with author).
9 Cameron, supra note 5, at 143.
10 Keith, supra note 4, at 196-200. Unfortunately, Keith does not develop, in my view,
adequately independent measures of"judicial independence."
I1 Lewis A. Komhauser, Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 45, 52.
12 Id. at53.
13 Id.
14 Walter F. Murphy, AIternative Political Systems, in CoNsnnmoNALPOLInCS: ESSAYS ON
CONSTmunON MAKING, MANMNANCE, AND CHANGE 9, 11-14 (2001).
15 Id. at 10-16.
16 Id.
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Komhauser, Murphy alerts us to "the problem of multiple realizability"; 17 even if
judicial independence is proven to achieve a particular objective, altemative structures
may do so as well. 18
The question of whether judicial independence advances human rights deserves a
closer look. This is the benefit most commonly cited by its proponents who claim that
independent judges will vigorously defend text-based rights and liberties, even in the
face of opposition by popular majorities or powerful politicians. 19 Again, however,
there are few studies that directly test this presumed linkage. Cameron only reports
two, one by Brickman that indeed found "a strong, statistically significant and
substantively important relationship between civil liberties and judicial
independence," and another by Yamanishi that more tentatively and unevenly links
judicial independence with human rights.20
While further study is certainly justified, both anecdotal evidence and logic
should lower our expectations of confirming a substantial causal connection between
judicial independence and human rights. First, the history of the court with the
greatest degree of independence-the U.S. Supreme Court-has not taught us that
independent judges will reliably defend constitutional liberties. For example, the
Court did not protect free speech during wartime or the McCarthy era.21 It has more
often than not ruled against politically vulnerable minorities-powerless workers in
the Lochne 2 2 and New Deal eras, homosexuals in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 3 poor
Latino children in Rodriguez,24 and racial minorities in a variety of cases, including
Dred Scott,25 Plessy,26 and Korematsu.27 Gerald Rosenberg also reminds us that
countries like England, France, and Australia that lack independent courts performed
17 Komhauser, supra note 11, at 53.
18 Murphy, supra note 14, at 22-32; see also Komhauser, supra note 11, at 53.
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20 Cameron, supra note 5, at 144 (citing reports of Danette Brickman, Judicial Independence
and the Protection of Civil Liberties: Cross-national Empirical Analysis (2000) (unpublished paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,
D.C.) (on file with author); Yamanishi, supra note 9.
21 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
22 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
25 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
26 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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better than the U.S. in respecting civil liberties and protecting political dissent during
the Cold War.28
Additionally, there is clear and conclusive evidence that judicial support for civil
liberties varies considerably. For example, O'Connor and Palmer's data from the
1993 to 1999 terms reveal dramatic differences in the percentage of pro-civil liberties
decisions by Supreme Court justices-ranging from a high of 72% for Stevens to a
low of 29% for Thomas and Rehnquist. 29 The proportion of pro-civil liberties
decisions by the Court as a whole has also varied considerably: 79% for the Warren
Court during the period of 1962 to 1968, compared to only 37% for the Rehnquist
Court from 1993 to 1998.30 These findings refute the traditional model's curious
assumption that independent judges invariably advance civil liberties.
Finally, evidence casts doubt on the related claim that independent judges will
override popular majorities in order to protect text-based rights and liberties. Research
has consistently found that Supreme Court decisions reflect and vary with public
opinion. 31 Especially to the point is the finding of Marshall and Ignagni that the Court
has ruled in favor of a civil rights, civil liberty, or equality claim far more often when
supported by the public (73% of the time) than when opposed by the public (40% of
the time).32
Difficulties in verifying the link between judicial independence and such
normative ends as prosperity and human rights should not be surprising given the
typical failure to elaborate its logical underpinnings. For example, we are neither told
why judges would be unusually and uniformly supportive of civil liberties or
economic efficiency, nor why unsympathetic voters and politicians would be likely to
put them into office. Certainly there are some exceptions to this customary oversight.
For example, Cameron reasons that independent courts might help to promote
economic growth because of their effectiveness in enforcing contracts and resolving
economic disputes.33 In another example, Murphy speculates how the "legitimizing
28 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Thinking About Judicial Independence 10 (Mar.Apr. 2001)
(unpublished paper presented at a conference sponsored by the American Judicature Society and
the Brennan Center for Justice, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia) (on file with author).
29 Karen O'Connor & Barbara Palmer, The Clinton Clones: Ginsburg, Breyer, and the
Clinton Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 262, 267 (2001).
30 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 155 (7th ed. 2001).
31 See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192 (1989);
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact ofPublic Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 87,
91 (1993); James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 543, 551
(1995).
32 Thomas R. Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and Public Support for Rights
Claims, 78 JUDICATURE 146, 148 (1994).
33 Cameron, supra note 5, at 141.
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effect of judicial review ... may quiet doubts among losers as well as neutrals,"
thereby contributing to political stability.34
It is clear that there are significant weaknesses in the logical, statistical, and
anecdotal support for a judicial independence-rights protection link. However, we
need not be dispirited by this fact. Securing human rights through legal text and
independent courts is not the most effective or desirable way to do so. Civil liberties
are better protected through deliberative democratic processes than through
independent courts acting with finality.
Judge Learned Hand warned us about both the futility and the danger of
entrusting too much of the rights-protection enterprise to judges.35 He wisely
observed that:
"a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a
society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that a society which evades
its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in
the end will perish."
36
James Bradley Thayer similarly argued that" 'under no system can the power of
courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere.' -37 That
too is the lesson of Gerald Rosenberg's study of the Supreme Court's social reform
efforts in such areas as civil rights, abortion, and rights of the accused.38 Courts do
not typically succeed when they try to vindicate affirmative rights like right to counsel
for indigents, equal educational opportunity, or abortion access. Instead, the success
of their rights-based initiatives has depended upon the willingness of other political
actors to comply and provide implementation support.
We should, as a people committed to both democratic governance and human
rights, be comforted by that message. Leaving the protection of rights to judges
regarded as superior and supreme is elitist and hostile to democratic values.
Furthermore, this "judicial monopoly... decreases the number of arenas in which
constitutional dialogue occur[s and] is corrosive of constitutional literacy. ' 39 This
elitist vision excludes citizens and their elected representatives from the legitimate
34 Murphy, supra note 14, at 1 5. However, Murphynotes that the available evidence does not
support this hypothesis. Public knowledge of and support for the Court is insufficient for it to play
a legitimizing role. Id. at 35 n.33.
3 5 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23 (1962).
36 Id. (quoting Learned Hand, The Contribution ofan Independent Judiciary to Civilization,
in THE SPIIT OF LIBERTY 172, 181 (Irving Dillard ed., 1952)).
37 Id. (quoting James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 39 (Boston Book Co. 1908)).
3 8 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
39 John E. Finn, The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITrTIONAL POLMCS:
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, supra note 15, at 41, 58.
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task of choosing, shaping, and reshaping our fundamental values and ideals; "the
constitutional enterprise" should instead be regarded as "a broadly democratic
affair." 40
As Thayer argued, too heavy a reliance on judges to vindicate our rights and
correct our moral and political mistakes is perilous in that the people may lose both
the experience and the responsibilities of citizenship.41 In the same vein, Rosenberg's
evidence challenges the wisdom of social reformers who succumb to the "lure of
litigation" and invest their limited resources in winning legal rather than political
victories.42 For example, he suggests that the predominantly legal strategy of pro-
choice groups led them to let down their guard after Roe v. Wade,43 forgetting the
hard political work that necessarily and properly attends the creation and preservation
of constitutional rights.44 They were unprepared for the anti-abortion movement and
the onslaught of legislative activity and new abortion restrictions that followed.45 The
lesson from a variety of failed litigation-based reform efforts is clear: public
education, voter and group mobilization, and legislative lobbying are more certain
(and of course more democratic) avenues to rights vindication than leaving that task
to independent judges.
A final point is that even if we wanted to insure that judges advance civil liberties
with great vigor and regularity, granting them independence is an uncertain, if not
curious method of doing so. As previously noted, liberal judges (who are
predominantly Democratic judges appointed by Democratic presidents) are
significantly more likely to vote in favor of civil rights and civil liberties claims.46 If
the desired end is the certainjudicial protection of those rights, a more logical and
effective strategy would be to elect Democrats to the White House and Senate in the
interest of placing more liberals on the bench. After all, the notable reductions in the
Supreme Court's support for civil liberties claims that have occurred in recent
decades can be directly tied to the election of Republican presidents and the
conservative judicial appointments they subsequently made.47 Judicial independence
empowers all judges, regardless of their commitment to civil rights and civil liberties
and is, thus, an odd and ineffective approach to the cause of human rights.
To summarize, the evidentiary and logical support for the linkage between
judicial independence and human rights is weak. We need not despair, however. In
40 Id. at 57-58.
41 BICKEL, supra note 35, at 21-22 (quoting JAMEs B. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103--04,
106-07 (Houghton Mifflin 1901)).
42 ROSENBERG, supra note 38, at 341.
43 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44 ROSENBERG, supra note 38, at 339-42.
45 Id.
46 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. For a review of leading studies on this
topic, see TERRI JENNINGS PERETn, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999).
47 BAUM, supra note 30, at 154-57.
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fact, a true commitment to human rights would recognize that judicial independence
neither effectively nor democratically secures them and that there are superior
alternatives to their vindication.
M. THE IDEOLOGICAL USE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The lack of evidence that judicial independence guarantees human rights is not
surprising in light of a second fact revealed by social science: when given the
opportunity to do so, judges decide in accordance with their ideological values. An
extensive body of research confirms "the attitudinal model" which assumes "that
judges-particularly appellate court jurists-view cases primarily in terms of the
broad political, socioeconomic issues they raise and ... generally respond to these
issues in accordance with their personal values and attitudes."48
Particularly for the U.S. Supreme Court, research has found considerable
decision-making variation, predictable decision-making patterns, and ample evidence
that those patterns are the product of personal ideology.49 For instance, Baum reports
substantial variation among the justices in the proportion of liberal votes cast in the
1998 term: 76% for Stevens, a range of 56% to 58% for the remaining members of
the Court's liberal wing (Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter), and 23% to 35% for the
Court's conservatives (Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist).50
Additionally, ideologically compatible justices like Scalia and Thomas vote together
at very high rates (86%) while justices at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum
like Stevens and Thomas vote together far less frequently (46%).51 Finally, changes in
the Court's membership and ideological composition produce corresponding policy
changes. For example, significant reductions in the Court's support for civil liberties
occurred after the arrival of the Nixon and Bush appointees. 52
An important qualification that must be made is that how much freedom judges
have to "vote their values" depends both on the nature of the issue and the level of the
judiciary. For example, lower court judges will make thousands of spur-of-the-
moment decisions, most of them on routine matters like criminal misdemeanors and
traffic and divorce cases that afford little discretion. The opportunity for advancing
their ideological preferences is far less frequent than for Supreme Court justices who
48 DAVID W. NEUBAUER, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS, AND PoLTcs IN THE UNITED
STATES 410 (2d ed. 1997); see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
4 9 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATnTUDINAL
MODEL 69 (1993); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological
Values and the Votes of US. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
50 BAUM, supra note 30, at 147.
5 11d. at 51.
52 Id. at 155-56.
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decide fewer cases but ones often involving difficult, discretionary, and high-stakes
policy choices.
Supreme Court justices enjoy considerably more decisional freedom than lower
court judges. Yet studies of Supreme Court decision-making do not show that judicial
independence is used for the noble end of providing consistent protection to text-
based rights and liberties. Instead, research conclusively proves that judges use their
freedom to advance their ideological preferences, which mayor may not be consistent
with the text or with a human rights agenda.53
We need not regard this research finding as cause for concern, however. Judges
pursuing their ideological preferences help to fulfill a variety of legitimate, democratic
ends. For example, the existence of ideological patterns in judicial decision-making
invites and enables informed public and elite scrutiny of judicial nominees. A good
example (and a healthy development) is the considerable speculation about Judge
Garza, a likely Bush nominee to the Supreme Court.54 Politicians, reporters, and
interest groups have long operated under the valid assumption that ajudge's political
views matter and that an inquiry into those views is quite legitimate. Because
ideological patterns are typically apparent in the decision-making records ofjudicial
nominees, presidents and senators who select judges are encouraged and able to shape
the future direction of judicial policy.
Ideological decision-making by judicial appointees, once on the bench, then
fulfills the expectations of the elected officials who have selected them. Judges who
use their decisional freedom in this way are, in my view, fulfilling their democratic
obligation. The ideological values reflected in a judge's decisions are a democratic
proxy; elected officials have deliberately planted those values on the bench on behalf
of their supporters and are, thus, democratically shaping judicial policy.55 This view
lends legitimacy to the Court's efforts in the early 1930s to protect the preexisting
political consensus against economic regulation and to resist the dramatic new policy
course represented by FDR's New Deal. It alternatively casts doubt on the legitimacy
of the Warren Court's freewheeling egalitarian ventures, given that they were not the
product of a prior electoral and political consensus.56
In this sense, judges who decide in accordance with the value premises of their
appointment can also enhance political stability. They do so by protecting past
53 See supra notes 29-30 and 48.
54 Alec C. Ewald, Getting Ready for Garza? Judge Emilio Garza, Civil Liberties and the
Politics of Judicial Selection, 12 L. & CTS. 11 (2002).
55 PERETTI, supra note 46, at 84-132.
56 1 have elsewhere tentatively offered a pluralist defense of the Warren Court that focuses on
its expansion of interest representation and its promotion of a sense of fair play by tending to the
concerns of "out" groups. Ambivalence more accurately characterizes my view of the Warren
Court. I am concerned about any Court that so dramatically "free-lances," though I remain assured
that political checks will effectively limit the success of its policy ventures. See id. at 219,222-24,
232-33,238, 242.
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political bargains from being voided by a single election or short-term political trends,
a normative end desired by the Constitution's framers. When a set of values or groups
wins sufficient support in presidential and Senate elections, they are justifiably
granted long-term representation on the Court. The "prize" that is won is right-
thinking judges with life tenure. Those judges can help to insure that a fickle
electorate cannot easily void prior policy commitments or quickly transform past
winners into losers. A new value or policy consensus must win widespread and long-
term approval represented by yet another set of right-thinking judges with life tenure.
This is similar, in general though not specific terms, to the Landes-Posner model
(1975), which asserts that independent, textually-minded judges lend durability to the
statutory privileges granted to interest groups, thus enabling legislators to charge
higher rent from groups seeking legislative favors.57 These judges are, much as I have
argued, enforcing interest group bargains. However, in the Landes-Posner view,
judges protect interest group bargains because of their adherence to norms of
textualism and precedent. 58 In my view, judges (at least in cases involving significant
policy issues) enforce interest group bargains because they personally favor those
bargains. In the Landes-Posner view, independent judges enforcing legislative deals
serve less than noble ends-enabling interest groups politics and satisfying the self-
seeking motives of legislators.59 In my view, judicial enforcement of interest group
bargains can serve broader public purposes like political stability and interest
representation. It is to this latter goal that I now turn.
It is commonplace to observe that the framers, in designing the Constitution, were
strongly motivated by a fear of tyranny, particularly a majority tyranny that would
likely develop in a democratic system. They went to great lengths to prevent a selfish
majority from easily gaining control of government. For example, they adopted a
representational scheme in which only the House of Representatives would be
directly elected and elections would be staggered, both within the Senate and
throughout the government. As a result, a momentary majority could not sweep into
power in a single election. Additionally, power was divided between the three
national branches of government and between the state and federal governments.
With checks and balances, a majority would need to gain simultaneous control of
these various governmental units, no mean task given staggered elections and the
non-electoral selection of so many different officials.
57 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875-901 (1976). Several articles that extend or critique the model
are: Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the Independent Judiciary in
Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CoN. POL. ECON. 1-21 (1994); W. Mark Crain & Robert D.
Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 165-75
(1979); Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth
Transfers, 22 J.L. & ECON. 215-28 (1989).
58 Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 879, 883.
59 Id. at 877-78, 880-85 (1975).
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The thrust of the system is negative in the sense that no group, including a
majority, can easily gain control of the government and enact its selfish policies.
However, there is a positive aspect as well: every group, even a minority, has the
opportunity to challenge, in a variety of institutional settings, policies it regards as
harmful to its interests. Because each institution is designed differently in terms of
selection method and term of office, the chances that a group will win in one of those
arenas is increased. Additionally, due to checks and balances, one branch can
effectively stop another branch (at least temporarily); victory in only one branch is all
that is required.
Independent judges can thus provide valued assistance to a group seeking to stop
a policy inimical to its interests. An independent judiciary offers interest groups not
only hope, but a real opportunity to win some policy concessions. Judicial
independence provides additional officials in an alternate setting with some power to
grant policy assistance and is, thus, good for interest groups. It contributes to a more
robust and democratic form of interest group politics. It may also be good for our
sense of fair play and tolerance in a system that inevitably chooses winners and losers.
As Walter Murphy has argued:
judicial review... allows losers in the political processes to appeal to judges rather
than to heaven. By restricting the power of elected officials as well as ofbureaucrats,
constitutional democracy lowers the stakes of politics. If life, liberty, and property
depended on the outcome of the next election, thoughtful citizens might be reluctant
to accept that decision-making process unless it were grounded in a political culture
that limits power and guarantees continued opportunities for political
participation.60
Although the judiciary can serve as an additional institutional site for groups to
protect their interests, there are limits on the freedom of judges in choosing which
groups to help. First, as previously argued, their predisposition to help certain groups
over others is strongly influenced by those who selected them. The bench has in a
sense been "programmed." Second, as the next section will argue, various political
checks limit the power of judges to advance their preferences effectively.
IV. LIMITS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Although I ultimately conclude that American judges enjoy only a modest
amount of independence, there are serious difficulties involved in making that
appraisal. First, "the quantum and quality of judicial independence ... may vary
dramatically between courts in the United States," with federal courts generally
possessing more than state courts and appellate judges more than trial court judges.61
60 Murphy, supra note 14, at 15.
61 Burbank & Friedman, supra note 2, at 17.
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Definitional disagreements pose additional problems in measuring judicial
independence. For example, Ferejohn has famously distinguished between decisional
independence and institutional independence.62 Burbank has criticized political
scientists for erroneously equating political influence with political control and thus
too quickly dismissing judicial independence as a myth.63 Komhauser finds
considerable variability in the meaning of judicial independence not only between
social scientists and legal scholars, but within each group as well. 64 He concludes
that the definitional confusion is so great that judicial independence cannot be
considered "a useful, analytical concept" and should be abandoned.65 Rubin partially
agrees, arguing that "independence" is a constructive concept, as long as we
recognize its general utility in describing the interconnections among governmental
units and eliminate its peculiar association with the judiciary. 66
Despite these various concerns, we can state with confidence that federal judges,
including Supreme Court justices, are subject to significant limitations on their
independence, both decisional and institutional. Congress can impeach judges, set
and regulate jurisdiction, change the size of the bench, raise (or not raise) judicial
salaries, allocate judicial staff and budgets, propose constitutional amendments, and
revise statutory interpretations it dislikes. Congress also chooses whether and at what
level to fund judicial policies. The President appoints judges (with Senate approval),
influences the Court's agenda, and enforces court rulings (fully, partially, or not at
all). Additionally, both the President and members of Congress can try to mobilize the
public and interest groups for or against courts and their policies. Clearly, courts are
"remarkably dependent on political officials" 67 who can, if they choose, "severely
undermin[e] the judiciary."68
For several reasons, however, those checks are rarely invoked formally, making
them seem ineffective and giving the appearance ofjudicial independence. First, as
discussed more fully in the next section, there are powerful incentives for the other
branches willingly to cede authority and autonomy to the judiciary. The most obvious
example is when there exists partisan and ideological congruence between the
branches. The conclusion that the judiciary is truly independent is accordingly more
62 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353,355 (1999).
63 Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture ofJudiciallndependence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315,
328(1999).
64 Komhauser, supra note 11, at 46.
65 Id.
66 Edward L. Rubin, Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
supra note 1,at 91.
67 Ferejohn, supra note 62, at 359.
68 Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors Affecting Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 148.
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difficult to defend. Another reason the other branches would rarely invoke formal
sanctions is if courts acted strategically to avoid inviting a political response.
Ferejohn alerts us to the possibility that although "the federal judiciary is
institutionally dependent on Congress and the President, for jurisdiction, rules, and
execution of judicial orders" its members may still enjoy decisional independence,
being "free to decide the case before [them] without fear or anticipation of
(illegitimate) punishments or rewards. '69 Supreme Court justices would seem to be
especially good candidates for decisional freedom, given that they do not aspire to
higher office, cannot be overturned by a higher court; enjoy tenure and salary
protections, exercise broad discretion in case selection, and deal with highly
ambiguous legal issues.70
It is true that Supreme Court justices do not face immediate removal (or even
lesser penalties) for making a wrong or unpopular decision and, to that degree, enjoy
considerable decisional independence. Nonetheless, most Supreme Court justices
want their decisions to have a real policy impact, beyond being a discussion topic in a
law school classroom. Accordingly, they must behave strategically, accommodating
the preferences of others who can enhance or limit policy success.71 For example,
judges on collegial courts must secure enough votes to produce a majority decision.
Judges who care deeply about their policy preferences must also consider and
accommodate the likely reactions of officials with the discretionary power to
implement, ignore, or undermine their decisions. They will also seek to avoid
decisional modification by Congress and the imposition of formal sanctions, such as
jurisdiction stripping or a refusal to fund judicial salaries and budgets adequately.
There is substantial evidence to support this model of strategic judicial behavior.
Interdependent behavior due to endogenous constraints is evident throughout the
Supreme Court decision-making process, from case selection to opinion writing.72
The Court has at times clearly acted to avoid or soften Congressional opposition.73
69 Ferejohn, supra note 62, at 355.
70 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 49, at 69.
71 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICEs JUSICES MAKE 95-111 (1998) (discussing
the strategy, reasonableness, implications, and components ofjudicial decisions); SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTmTUTONALIST APPROACHES (Comwell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTs OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (discussing
the framework within which judicial decisions are made, including sources and limitations on
judicial power, the impact of policy on judicial decisions, and the strategy ofjudicial decisions).
7 2 FORREsT MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL
GAME (2000) (discussing the implications of strategic judicial decision-making throughout the
judicial process).
73 Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society:
Playing the Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315,318 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995);
see also William Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613,613 (1991); Rafael Gely& Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice
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Two of the more obvious examples are when it began upholding New Deal programs
in 1937 and when it backed down in protecting civil liberties in the late 1950s.
Rosenberg has demonstrated that court-curbing bills, even when unsuccessful, have
decisional effects, leading him to reject the claim of judicial independence for the
Supreme Court. 74 The Court is also deferential to the executive branch as seen in the
extraordinary access and success enjoyed by the Solicitor General's office. 75 Political
scientists disagree over the force of these strategic considerations in inhibiting
Supreme Court justices from voting their sincere preferences. 76 However, most agree
that Supreme Court justices pursue their ideological or policy goals, primarily by
voting their preferences but also by accommodating those who can limit policy
success.
77
Certainly, judges are free to ignore strategic considerations and tolerate policy
irrelevance or failure, and some do. For example, both Justices Douglas and Scalia
have cared little for coalition building within the Court and policy success outside of
it. This indeed is the flip side of the coin. Judges can choose, curiously, to be more
independent yet less influential. The lesson remains, however: ifjudges desire policy
success, they must acknowledge and accommodate limits on their independence.
They must sometimes accede to the wishes of others.
I assume that this third fact-that judges, even Supreme Court justices, do not
enjoy complete independence-is the least controversial and the easiest to defend
normatively. No one claims that judges have a monopoly on virtue and truth and that
they should accordingly be subject to no decisional constraints whatsoever. After all,
"wholly unaccountable judges are as likely to deviate from what the law might
demand as follow it. Thus, some amount of accountability seems essential .... ,178
Limited judicial independence additionally resonates with a powerful strain in
American political thought. Americans have long been skeptical of government
Theory of the Supreme Court with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 263,284-96 (1990).
74 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV.
POL. 369 (1992).
75 See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SourOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 19-32 (1987); Jeffrey A. Segal, Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRmCALASSESsMENT373-93 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 569-72 (1994); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme
Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of Presidential Appointments, 43 W. POL. Q.
137, 137-52 (1990).
76 See Jeffery A. Segal, Seperation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 28-35 (1997); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to
Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTnmONAUST APPROACHES 237-54 (C.W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
77 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997).
78 Stephen B. Burbank, Barry Friedman, & Deborah Goldberg, Introduction, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 1, at 3, 4.
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power and competence, and they have demanded that all government officials be
accountable to the people, directly or indirectly through elections. The common use of
judicial elections in the states reflects that impulse.
Political checks rightly insure that federal judges, though not elected, can be
reined in if the people and their representatives so desire. Unpopular policy ventures
by courts can be and have been checked and even reversed. Such was the case with
the anti-New Deal Court of the 1930s. That Court dramatically shifted course in
1937, adopting the rather strange position that the Constitution does not protect
economic liberty and that Congress can regulate virtually anything it wants if it can
remotely and quite imaginatively be linked with interstate commerce. 79 The Warren
Court was also checked, although in less dramatic fashion. A succession of
Republican presidential victories and conservative judicial appointments slowed, and
in some cases halted, that Court's egalitarian policy course.80
Whether through the laws they write, the judges they select, the judicial decisions
they ignore, or the pressure they apply, elected officials can insure that courts will
(generally and over time, if not in the individual case) be responsive to the people.
This comports with the longstanding requirement in American democracy of political
accountability for all government officials.
V. STRUCTURAL VERSUS BEHAVIORAL CAUSES OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The final empirical finding of political science to be examined here is that
judicial independence is not guaranteed by formal structural protections like life
tenure. Rather, political factors, particularly the political incentives facing other
officials, are more powerfil determinants of judicial independence. Simply put,
judges have as much autonomy as politicians are willing to cede them, though that is
often considerable.
The causes of judicial independence are not well understood. It is too often
simply assumed that formal structural features like tenure and salary protections
guarantee an independent judiciary. Research, however, suggests otherwise.. For
example, Stephenson's review of various comparative studies reveals that formal
constitutional protections regarding judicial selection, promotion, tenure, salary, and
79 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 81 (1937); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 128.128-29 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung,
397 U.S. 294 (1964). With regard to the dramatic shift in the Court's views on state regulatory
power, see West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
80 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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budget that other countries have adopted have not insured judicial independence. 81
Furthermore, he finds that "some countries actually give their judiciaries more
independence than is strictly required by the relevant formal restrictions. '" 82
Kornhauser finds the British experience instructive.83 He notes that although Great
Britain is a parliamentary democracy, lacking separation of powers, and its high court
is at least formally a mere parliamentary agency, "British judges are generally
regarded as independent; that independence is sustained both by statute and by the
political and legal cultures." 84 Cameron rejects structural protections as mere
"parchment barriers to an aggressive executive or legislature," pointing to the
example of Argentina, where "strong executives have fired high court justices at will,
despite legal prohibitions to the contrary. 85
Clearly, formal structural protections are an inadequate guide to the degree of
independence enjoyed by a nation's judiciary. The autonomy of judges must be
measured independently, and discovering its true causes requires looking beyond
formal rules and structural arrangements. Several scholars invite us to examine
informal norms, political conditions, and behavioral factors as more likely
determinants of judicial independence. For example, Cameron suggests that formal
constitutional protections like life tenure must be supported by a political norm that
insures punishment for the executive or legislature that tries to remove judges from
office, life tenure notwithstanding. 86 Similarly, Geyh suggests that our understanding
ofjudicial independence can be improved by focusing on "the constitutional customs
or norms that Congress employs in deciding whether and how to regulate the third
branch," providing as an example "the defacto prohibition on congressional court
packing and unpacking." 87 Without these social norms and conventions, formal rules
supporting judicial independence matter little.
Stephenson reminds us that the idea of judicial independence-"people with
money and guns" willingly "submit[ting] to people armed only with gavels"--is quite
81 Matthew C. Stephenson, When the Devil Turns: The Political Foundations of Independent
Judicial Review 5 (Aug. 30, 2001), available at http://pro.harvard.edu/abstracts/026/
026009Stephenson.htm. (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association).
82 Id.
83 Komhauser, supra note 11, at 47.
84 Id. (citation omitted). Cameron adds a dissenting voice, however, citing the finding of
Salzberger and Fenn that English judges who rule against the government are less likely to be
promoted than those who do not. Cameron, supra note 5, at 138 (citing Eli Salzberger & Paul
Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidencefrom the English Court ofAppeals, 42 J.L. & ECON.
831,831-47 (1999)).
85 Cameron, supra note 5, at 139.
86 Id.
87 Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, note 1, at
160, 161,167.
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puzzling. 88 He consequently suggests that we look to "the political factors that give
the government an incentive to obey the rulings of independent courts."'89 He finds
that democratic stability and political competition are two political conditions that
help to foster judicial independence. 90 The logic supporting these causal connections
is that:
independent judicial review may be a way for parties to minimize the risks
associated with uncertain, and ongoing, political competition. Respecting judicial
independence may require the party that currently controls the government to
sacrifice some policy objectives, but it also means that, when that party is out of
power, its opponent faces similar limitations. Parties that ignore unfavorable court
rulings when in power risk retaliation in kind when the political winds shift.91
Franklin urges us to examine the behavioral, and not just the institutional, factors
that affect judicial independence. 92 For instance, he calls judicial reformers to task for
failing to understand fundamental facts about the behavioral incentives facing voters,
interest groups, and judges in judicial elections. 93 For example, we know that "most
ballots cast in judicial elections are based only on the most fragmentary knowledge,"
particularly in nonpartisan elections.94 Without a partisan cue, voters are more easily
swayed by a potent interest group appeal that criticizes individual judicial decisions.
Additionally, judges must exercise greater and more continuous decisional caution
because they have no protective partisan base and cannot predict which particular
decision might become an interest group target. In other words, judges subject to
nonpartisan elections are less independent. In seeking to insulate the judiciary from
political influence, reformers have chosen institutions like retention and nonpartisan
elections that ironically "make elected judges more subject to capricious voters [and]
more vulnerable to attacks by interest groups." 95 Again, the message is that informal,
behavioral factors matter greatly when it comes to judicial independence and may
undermine the presumed imperatives of fbrmal institutional rules.
Ferejohn, at least initially, finds the stability ofjudicial independence puzzling,
given that "the American system... does not really provide much protection for
judicial independence, all things considered. 96 He too examines political behavior
and incentives, speculating why the other branches might willingly grant autonomy to
88 Stephenson, supra note 81, at 4.
89 1d. at5.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 6-7.
92 Franklin, supra note 68, at 148-49.
93 Id. at 149.
94 Id. at 151.
9 5 Id. at 149.
96 Ferejohn, supra note 62, at 381.
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the judiciary rather than use "their ample constitutional powers to infringe on judicial
authority. '97 Much of the answer is ideological congruence: "in normal
circumstances, the actions of the judiciary are not far out of step with the general
policy preferences of the popular branches."9 8 Why bother attacking and asserting
control over an institution that largely supports your policies? By implication, the
judiciary is most vulnerable when Congress and the executive are ideologically united
but ideologically distant from the judiciary, and evidence supports this logic. 99
History verifies that such imbalances are rare, but when they occur, courts are indeed
at risk, as seen in the early Jeffersonian period, the post-Civil War era, and the early
New Deal years. American politics has, however, consisted mostly of stable political
rule occasionally interrupted by short-lived realignments. During these lengthy
periods of political stability, Congress and the executive will defer to the judiciary
because it is considered a regime partner rather than a regime opponent.
Whittington provides a similar inquiry and conclusion regarding the political
incentives underlying judicial independence.100 He argues that presidential assaults
on the judiciary are likely to be exceptional.10' It is only "reconstructive" presidents
like Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt, appearing during rare periods of realignment,
who challenge judicial authority to assign constitutional meaning; they do so as a
necessary part of their task of destroying the "collapsing regime" and establishing a
new one. 102 More typically, courts serve the self-interests of presidents. 0 3 For
example, "affiliated" presidents benefit from the ability of courts to overcome
impasses within the ruling coalition and to take political heat from voters. 104
"Preemptive" presidents who oppose the existing regime have the law as their only
ally and "cannot afford to undermine a potentially helpful institution." 10 5
These various scholars help us to see that "formal, structural protections are
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure judicial independence."' 1 6 Of greater
importance are the political incentives of the other branches to grant autonomy to the
97 Id. at 382.
98 Id. at 383.
99 See Richard Pacelle & Bryan W. Marshall, Strategic or Sincere? The Supreme Court in
Constitutional Decisions 11 (2001), (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association). available at http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/026/
026009MarshallBr.pdf.
100 Keith E. Whittington, The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, in
CONsTITUTIONAL PoLrIcs: ESSAYS ON CONSTruTnON MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 261,
263 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001).
101 Id. at 269.
102 Id. at 265, 270-75.
103 Id. at 269.
104 Id. at 279.
105 Id. at 285.
106 Cameron, supra note 5, at 140.
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judiciary. Thus, the historical infrequency of challenges to judicial authority is not
proof of the power of constitutional provisions protecting judicial tenure, salaries, and
budgets. Instead, politicians permit judicial independence under conditions of inter-
branch ideological congruence, a common outcome given stable political rule in the
United States. The popular branches will also defer to judicial authority when it
serves their self-interests: for example, when courts can help with internal coalition
disputes or protect the "in-party" when it temporarily loses power in a competitive
electoral system. Judicial independence is thus "politically conditioned" rather than
determined by formal rules and structures. 107
This is an especially important lesson for reformers. They have too often relied on
a formalistic understanding ofjudicial independence that rests on assumptions rather
than evidence. The end result is policy recommendations like nonpartisan elections or
the merit plan that are doomed to fail or that produce surprising and undesirable
consequences. As Fiorina and Peterson advise, "If reforms are to be effective, they
must take incentives into account. All too often, reformers forget that premise and
substitute good intentions and rosy scenarios for realistic analyses. Accurate
appraisals of reform require.., realistic, incentive-based institutional analysis.' 10 8
Understanding the critical importance of political conditions and incentives for
judicial independence leads to the final normative claim to be defended-that courts
properly exist within a system of mutual interdependencies. This in turn alerts us to
the possibility that assaults on judicial independence can be valuable.
A simplistic Bickelian perspective (i.e., the "counter-majoritarian paradigm") has
for too long dominated normative legal scholarship. 109 In this view, the political
branches are majoritarian and dependent on the people, and the judiciary is properly
independent of both and can therefore neutrally evaluate a law's consistency with
legal principle. This tendency to see independence as peculiarly judicial has not
served us well, however." 0
While it is important to understand that judicial independence is limited, it is
equally important to understand that so is Congressional independence and
presidential independence. American politics, by design and in practice, occurs within
a system of mutual institutional interdependencies. Checks and balances insure that
no institution, not Congress or the executive or the judiciary, possesses complete and
unilateral policymaking authority. Limits on institutional independence are the norm
in American democracy. Yet another norm is the nonhierarchical arrangement of
those institutions. Congress is not superior to the President, nor the President to the
judiciary, nor is the judiciary superior to either. In other words, the legitimacy or
107 Whittington, supra note 100, at 292.
10 8 MoRRs FIORINA & PAUL E. PETERSON, THE NEW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 24 (2d ed.
2002) (election update).
109 Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional
Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 933,937-47 (2001).
110 Rubin, supra note 66, at 56-63.
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presumptive validity of an institution's decision is not dependent on its proximity to
or distance from the people. Each branch possesses the right and the power to check
the other and thereby to contribute to policy deliberation and development.
When there is substantial ideological congruence among the branches, policy
debate and decision-making proceeds relatively smoothly; when there is substantial
ideological divergence among the branches, policy making can be quite fractious.
This is both logical and desirable. When a strong consensus exists, inter-branch
relations are and should be more harmonious; the government is united in pursuing a
broadly-shared policy consensus. However, when the people are deeply divided,
inter-branch conflict and clashes are both likely and useful. The process may be
messy and include ugly political attacks, but such conflict produces a political
dialogue that brings us closer to the consensual resolution of vexing public issues.
Whittington, for example, argues that there is value in the occasional assaults on
judicial authority by reconstructive presidents."I' He notes that all five reconstructive
presidents-Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Reagan--'"were concemed
with re-envisioning the foundations of the American constitutional order." 12 Strong
judicial opposition led them to "denounce" and "discredit" the Court, using it "as an
important foil for developing their own constitutional visions and for building
political support for themselves and their agenda." 113 While the end result is a
weakening ofjudicial independence, "constitutionalism as such is not threatened. The
constitutional regime is reinvigorated through a wider political debate over its content
and its future." 14 In other words, "[j]udicial supremacy has given way not when we
need it most, but when it is needed least."'115
Serious attacks on judicial independence occur sporadically and for good reason.
They are typically an expression of deep conflict within the polity over which values
and policy choices should prevail. To the degree that a productive political dialogue
ensues and a consensus is reached, then such attacks serve broader public purposes.
During such periods, the judiciary is not without its allies in the legal academy and the
legal profession who can be counted on to rally to its side. In any case, the judiciary is
inevitably brought into line with the consensus that ultimately emerges, and the crisis
passes. Judicial resistance serves a valuable function, however. It helps to insure that
the old consensus is decisively rejected and the new one carefully and consensually
embraced. Of course, legislative and executive resistance to judicial rulings
contributes in the same way. Our system of mutual institutional interdependencies
insures that no single branch can alone move public policy or constitutional values in
anew direction. Instead, policy-making consists of a dynamic process of inter-branch
111 Whittington, supra note 100, at 275.
112 Id. at 274-75.
113 Id. at 275.
14 Id.
115 Id. at 291.
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acquiescence, dialogue and, at times, intense conflict. The Court, fortunately, is not
above or apart from this inherently political process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Normative discussions of judicial independence have for too long ignored the
research conclusions of social science. This unsurprisingly produces fruitless reform
efforts, ineffective reforms, and frustrated reformers. Another unsurprising result is
intellectual stagnation and the call by some scholars simply to abandon judicial
independence altogether as an academic enterprise.
Embracing normatively the social scientific facts about courts reviewed here is
not, in my view, such a difficult or dreadful task. We need not be troubled by basic
facts about judicial independence-that it is limited and politically conditioned, does
not appear to advance human rights, and, at least for higher courts with the most
freedom, is used to advance the ideological preferences ofjudges. These facts are not
problematic. Judicial independence that is politically contingent and used for
ideological ends insures political accountability, expands interest group
representation, and contributes to stable democratic governance. It is furthermore
consistent with the system of mutual interdependencies and constraints that the
framers intentionally and wisely created. Judicial independence is indeed a
misleading concept. Policy development occurs in a dynamic system of mutual
political constraints to which all institutions, the judiciary not excepted, are rightly
subject.
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